Why this book exists
A field guide for treating software supply chains as security boundaries.
The book starts from a simple premise: the system that builds and ships software is part of the attack surface. Package registries, signing flows, CI identities, release automation, and even AI-generated output all carry trust that has to be designed and defended.
- Map the trust boundaries before you compare packages.
- Treat automation identities like production credentials.
- Assume release workflows are an attack surface, not a convenience layer.
Current chapter arc
The first chapters cover the attack surface, the attacker’s workflow, and the most common blind spots.
- Chapter 1: The modern supply chain is a security boundary.
- Chapter 2: How attackers move from dependency trust to execution.
- Chapter 3: Identity, signing, and the release pipeline.
- Chapter 4: The hidden cost of AI-generated deception.
- Chapter 5: Practical defenses for small teams.
The easiest way to lose a system is to trust the easiest path into it.
Reference base
The manuscript is grounded in official guidance and primary sources.
References
- OWASP Software Supply Chain Security Top 10
Baseline threat taxonomy for the manuscript.
- NIST Secure Software Development Framework
Control guidance used to ground the work.
- CISA Secure by Design
Defensive posture that shapes the closing chapters.
- MITRE ATT&CK
Adversary technique mapping for the attack examples.